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The American "Covenant Marriage" in the Conflict
of Laws
Peter Hay*
I. THE PROBLEM DEFINED: THE EXTRA-STATE EFFECTS OF
COVENANT-MARRIAGE STANDARDS
The "covenant marriage," enacted in Louisiana, Arizona and
Arkansas,' and introduced in 26 other state legislatures,2 is a reaction
to the evolution of American family law, especially divorce law, over
the past quarter century. This paper explores the extent to which
limitations inherent in a covenant marriage are likely to be given
effect in non-covenant states and internationally. While beyond the
immediate scope of the paper, some of the issues raised also hold
implications for other current trends in family law, particularly
registered partnerships and same-sex marriages.
In the United States, family law, including divorce law, is state
law. Federal law governs the recognition of judgments generally3
and, as a result of more recent legislation, questions of jurisdiction
and recognition of judgments pertaining to child custody4 and
support.5 Federal statutoy 6 and treaty law also govern the civil and
Copyright 2004, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. Louisiana (1997): La. R.S. 9:272 et seq. (2003); Arizona: Ariz. R.S.
25-901 etseq.; Arkansas: Ark. Code § 9-11-801 etseq.
2. Alabama, California, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin. As of March 2004,'all Bills had
either failed in the states' senate or a senate committee, or further action was
postponed indefinitely, or the matter was withdrawn from schedule.
3. U.S. Constitution art. IV, § 1 (requiring states to give "Full Faith and
Credit" to judgments of sister states); E. Scoles, P. Hay, P. Borchers, S.
Symeonides, Conflict of Laws § 15.8 (3rd ed. 2000).
4. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2003),
implementing the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause with respect to
custody decrees.
5. Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C. §
1738B (2003).
6. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, supra note 4; Federal Parent
Locator Service 42 U.S.C. § 653 etseq. (2003), as amended; Federal Fugitive Felon
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criminal' consequences of child abduction by the non-custodial
parent or other party. But substantive family law is state law.9 This
includes marriage: the prerequisites for contracting it (age, degrees
of sanguinity, need for formality), the conditions for its dissolution
(grounds for divorce, waiting periods), and post-marital duties
(support for children and the ex-spouse) and rights (custody) of the
parties.
Different societies and different ages have varied greatly in their
approaches to marriage" and its dissolution. In Western culture,
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (2003), as amended; International Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1993, 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (2003).
7. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
as implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §
11601 etseq. (2003).
8. Fugitive Felon Act, International Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, both
supra note 6.
9. This result follows from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938): "There is no federal
general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in a State .... And no clause in the Constitution purports
to confer such a power upon the federal courts."
10. A few states still permit the "common law marriage," which requires no
compliance with formalities. Even states that do not permit such marriages will
recognize valid out-of-state common law marriages. For the latter, see, e.g., Cal.
Fam. Code § 308.
11. Traditionally, marriage is the formal union, sanctioned by church and state
or the state alone, of a man and a woman. More recently, same-sex couples can
contract marriage-like civil unions in a number ofjurisdictions (e.g., in Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
and Sweden, in the United States in California and Vermont, in Canada in Quebec,
British Columbia and Nova Scotia). These unions are intended to give the parties
rights, security, as well as obligations, but they are not identical with marriage. The
merger of the two institutions-by making marriage available to both heterosexual
and same-sex partners-is the most recent development: Netherlands and Belgian
legislation, the 2003 decision of the Supreme Court of Ontario, and generally all-
Canadian proposals are examples. For the Netherlands, see Johannes Wasmuth,
Eheschlieflung unter Gleichgeschlechtlichen in den Niederlanden und deutscher
ordrepublic, in Liber Amicorum Gerhard Kegel 237 (HilmarKrdiger & Heinz-Peter
Mansel eds., 2002); for Canada generally, see Jo-Anne Pickel, Judicial Analysis
Frozen in Time: EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 65 Sask. L.
Rev. 243-68 (2002); for Ontario, see Halpem v. Toronto (City),172 O.A.C. 276
(2003) (Ca.) (holding that the common-law definition of marriage offends the
equality rights of same-sex couples under s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms and ordering the granting of marriage licenses to such couples). On
July 17th, 2003, the Canadian federal government published a draft bill that would
define marriage as "the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of others."
The Government of Canada has asked the Supreme Court of Canada whether the
Parliament of Canada has the exclusive legislative authority to enact such a law,
and whether the draft is consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and
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classical Roman law took a very permissive view of dissolution of
marriage. 2 Modem Islamic religious law also readily accommodates
dissolution.1 3  When civil law became codified in 19th century
Europe, family law established strict preconditions for divorce. r
Freedoms. For the text of the current draft bill, see
http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/fs/2004/doc 3111 0.html. In the United
States, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the denial of the right
to marry to same-sex couples violated the state's constitution: Goodrich et al. v.
Dept't of Pub. Health et al., 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). The discussion that follows
focuses on the traditional heterosexual marriage that "covenant marriage"
legislation seeks to strengthen. In principle, however, much of what is said in
connection with party stipulations and undertakings would apply equally in the
context of civilly sanctioned same-sex unions or marriages.
12. "In classical law any marriage... can be dissolved by agreement of the
spouses or by notice given by one of them. Agreements which attempt to exclude
or to limit divorce are void, nor is it possible to stipulate for a penalty to be paid in
case of divorce." Fritz Schulz, Classical Roman Law 132 (1951). See also id. at
134-35.
13. In March 2002, a wife from India received a talaq or divorce electronically
(via email) from her Pakistani husband. Shortly thereafter, she remarried. See
Nadhi T. Rathi, Divorce by Email, available at
http://www.rediff.com/netguide/2002/apr/08sadia.htm (Apr. 8, 2002). According
to an Australian newspaper, Muslim men in Kuala Lumpur may use text messages
on mobile phones to divorce their wives. Mobile Phone Divorce, Daily Telegraph
(Sydney), July 29, 2003, at 22, available at 2003 WL 60840477.
14. Under the original French Code Civil, only fault was a ground, restricted
to adultery and violent and repeatedly abusive behavior. In 1945, serious offense
or neglect of marital duties so as to make continued marital community intolerable
were added. Since 1976, the law is as follows: fault (as before), alternatively: 1)
breakdown of the marriage and living separately for six years [unilateral application
by one spouse], Code Civil [C.Civ.] arts. 237-239 (Fr.); or 2) consensual divorce:
both agree or one proposes and the other accepts. The second option is not
available during the first 6 months of marriage. After application and conference
with the judge, there is a three months waiting period until divorce is granted. The
parties must submit a draft agreement that provides for the consequences of
dissolution. C. Civ. arts. 230-32. Germany also followed the fault principle. The
original version of the Civil Code (effective January 1, 1900) included, among other
grounds, adultery, bigamy, attempted homicide, abandonment, and the breakdown
of the marriage if caused by a grave neglect of marital duties or immoral behavior.
The 1938 Ehegesetz ("Marriage Act"), separating the divorce rules from the Civil
Code, added the breakdown of the marriage and living separately for three years.
However, the court had discretion to deny the divorce, if the plaintiff was
responsible for the breakdown. Effective July 1, 1977, the divorce rules were (re-)
incorporated into the Civil Code, now based on the sole ground of the breakdown
of the marriage. Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] §§ 1564-76 (F.R.G.). There is
an irrebuttable presumption for the breakdown if both parties have lived separately
for a year and both consent, otherwise if they have lived separately for three years.
BGB § 1566. In the German Democratic Republic, the breakdown principle had
already been introduced as early as 1965 and was in force until reunification in
1990. See also infra note 32. The jurisdictional rules in force in the European
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These have now given way to some form of divorce without fault (for
instance, because of the breakdown of the marriage) in all European
countries.15
Until the 1970's, 16 American divorce law was predominantly
fault-oriented; 7 when it was not, long waiting periods guarded
against a state's becoming a divorce haven.'" Since then, state law
has turned from fault-based divorce to no-fault divorce. 9 However,
waiting periods differ widely.2" In addition, some states recognize
virtually instant consensual foreign-country divorces, while others do
not.2 Nevertheless, in the United States a divorce granted by a court
of a sister-state with sufficient jurisdiction,2" or judicially recognized
by such a state,23 is entitled to recognition in all other states,
including in the original state of celebration. If expense is no
consideration, the parties-or even only one of them, seeking an ex
parte divorce-therefore, can obtain a valid divorce in the state with
the "easiest" requirements.
Union (except Denmark, which opted out) also provide for waiting periods:
Council regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 Concerning Jurisdiction and Enforcement
of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters ofParental Responsibility Art.
3(l)(a), [2003] Official Journal L 338/I.
15. No-fault divorces are available in, e.g., Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, England, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Scotland, Spain, Sweden.
See 1 European Family Law in Action 71-98 (Katharina Boele-Woelki et al. eds.,
2003).
16. Homer H. Clark, Jr.,The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States
§ 13.6 (2d ed. 1988); Joyce H. Green, et al., Dissolution of Marriage 61-62 (1986)
(claiming it was not California in 1969, but Kentucky (1850), Wisconsin (1866),
and Rhode Island (1893) that first enacted statutes making it possible to obtain a
divorce on no-fault grounds) (citing William E. McCurdy, Divorce-A Suggested
Approach with Particular Reference to Dissolution for Living Separate and Apart,
9 Vand. L. Rev. 685, 701 (1956) for the aforementioned statutes).
17. Until 1967, adultery was the only ground for divorce in New York, N.Y.
Dom. Rel. Law § 170 (Supp. 1967); see Michael L. McCarthy, Retroactive
Application of New Grounds for Divorce under § 170 Domestic Relations Law, 17
Buff. L. Rev. 902 (1968). This encouraged spouses to seek a divorce out of state.
See infra note 21.
18. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S. Ct. 553 (1975).
19. McCarthy, supra note 17, at 902; Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of
Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 Or. L. Rev. 649, 667 (1984).
20. Nevada: 6 weeks, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.020; 1 year: Iowa, Iowa Code §
598.6; Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-349.
21. See, e.g., Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1965). For
discussion of "easy" Haitian and Dominican Republic divorces and their
recognition, see Scoles, Hay, Borchers, Symeonides, supra note 3, at §§
15.20-15.22.
22. Scoles, Hay, Borchers, Symeonides, supra note 3, at §§ 15.6-15.14.
23. For such "domestication" of migratory divorces, see id. at § 15.14.
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States may wish to resist the trend toward easy divorce. They can
do so by retaining more traditional, stricter standards applicable to
all, or they can give those wishing to marry the alternative to opt out
of easy dissolution and to bind themselves even more fundamentally
-to do more than to enter into the status of marriage, but to covenant
to keep it that way except for well-defined reasons and in observance
of particular procedures.24
"Covenant" has both religious and secular law connotations. It
expresses commitment, devotion, perhaps acknowledgment of divine
command, but it is also reminiscent of contract-the undertaking to
do or not to do something. The dichotomy between the religious and
the civil aspects of marriage has been more apparent in Continental
law than in the United States. In Europe, marriage generally requires
a civil ceremony; a religious one is optional,25 and each has its own
prerequisites (e.g., the publication of banns).26 In the United States,
the civil and religious aspects merge when the marriage ceremony is
performed by religious authority. "Marriage" is easy and so is
divorce in a no-fault state.28  Hence the option, offered by the
24. "As evidence mounts of the social destruction in the wake of surging
divorce rates and currently surging cohabitation rates, action is required to restore
and protect the institution of marriage-the foundation upon which the family is
built." Katherine S. Spaht & Symeon C. Symeonides, Covenant Marriage and the
Law of Conflicts [sic] of Laws, 32 Creighton L. Rev. 1085, 1091 (1999). This
statement echoes concerns of earlier times: "It is this unlimited and illimitable
freedom of divorce [in Roman law] which seemed so highly objectionable to
modem moralists and lawyers and so obviously a sign of Roman decadence."
Schulz, supra note 12, at 132.
25. See, e.g., BGB § 1310(1). See also infra note 27. On the "secularization"
of family law and the spread of European secular notions to other parts of the
world, see Max Rheinstein, The Law of Family and Succession, in Civil Law in the
Modem World 27-57 (A.N. Yiannopoulos ed., 1965).
26. France: posting of marriage banns at town hall required no less than ten
working days before the date of marriage. Italy: If one of the parties is an Italian
citizen or resident, the marriage announcement has to be posted for two consecutive
Sundays at the city hall. This kind of prerequisite also exists in America: Ontario
Family Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. M.3, § 27(2) (Can.) (stating that marriage may not
take place until 5 days after publication of banns).
27. In several predominantly Catholic countries, civil law and authority will
recognize religious marriages, but still require civil registration. This is true, for
instance, in Spain with respect to Catholic and Protestant marriages. See
Agreement with the Holy See of 3 January 1975, VI(1-2); Law 24/1992, Nov. 10,
1992, 7(1). Stricter requirements apply to the recognition of Jewish ceremonies:
Law 25/1992, Nov. 10, 1992, Annex, 7(l),(3),(4). All of the foregoing reprinted in
Spanish Legislation on Religious Affairs 54, 79, 92 (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa
Maria Martinez de Codes eds., 1998).
28. The foregoing and previous comments assume that, in the United States,
marriage and divorce are governed by the lexfori. For further, more detailed
discussion, see infra Section II(B), at note 44 et seq.
2003]
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Louisiana legislation, to enter into something intended to be more
lasting, more secure, less vulnerable: the covenant marriage.29
Louisiana's version includes the following features that distinguish
such a marriage from the traditional form: (1) mandatory premarital
counseling to impress the seriousness of marriage upon the couple;30
(2) the signing of a "Declaration of Intent" by which the couple
promises to take all reasonable efforts to preserve the marriage and
stipulates for the application of Louisiana law;3' and (3) specified
fault-based grounds for divorce as well as no-fault divorce, the latter
conditioned, however, on a longer period of separation (2 years).
With respect to dissolution-although not with respect to formation
-a covenant marriage is remarkably similar to contemporary
substantive European divorce law. They are both a combination of
fault grounds and a no-fault possibility, with no-fault divorce made
more difficult.32
29. See generally Katherine S. Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social
Analysis and Legal Implications, 59 La. L. Rev. 63 (1998).
30. In keeping with American practice of permitting members of the clergy to
perform statutory functions in the creation of a marriage, the prescribed counseling
may be given by state-provided counselors or, at the couple's option, by a member
of the clergy. But, as the drafter of the Louisiana law (Professor Spaht) notes, the
provision also serves to "invite ... religion back into the public square for the
purpose of performing a function for which religion is uniquely qualified:
preparing for and preserving marriage." Spaht & Symeonides, supra note 24, at
1091 n.28. The contrast to Europe (supra at note 25), where there is generally far
more commingling of "church and state," yet not in this area, is startling.
3 1. The choice-of-law clause is a contract that other states may or may not
honor. For discussion, see infra at note 76. If a divorce action is brought in
Louisiana, it does not add anything to current practice that applies the lexfori. See
infra notes 42-44.
The promise to use "all reasonable efforts to preserve the marriage, including
marriage counseling" (La. R.S. 9:273(A)(1)) is said to be "a legally binding contract
permitted and sanctioned by the state as a limited exception to the fundamental
principle that the personal obligations of the marriage contract may not be altered
by the parties." Spaht & Symeonides, supra note 24, at 1090 n.22. However, it
bears emphasis that the parties may indeed contract with each other concerning
ownership rights in property, the modification or elimination ofspousal support, the
making of wills, and the law applicable to their agreement. See Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act [UPAA] § 3, 9C U.L.A. 43 (2003), which is in force in 27
jurisdictions. (25 states and the District of Columbia are listed as having adopted
the UPAA by the Uniform Law Commissioners, at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-upaa.asp. New
Jersey enacted a similar section. See N.J.S. 37:2-34. Legislation is pending in
Mississippi and West Virginia. Limitations derive from considerations of public
policy. See UPAA § 6, 9C U.L.A. 48. What the parties may not change by contract
thus relates to the status itself, i.e., how it is created and dissolved.
32. See, e.g., Germany: There is an irrebuttable presumption that the marriage
has broken down (and that a divorce is to be granted), if the spouses have lived
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When parties have contracted a covenant marriage in a covenant-
marriage state and one of them later seeks its dissolution there, he or
she will be held to the standards applicable to such marriages. But,
what if one of them changes his or her domicile (which is one of the
traditional bases for divorce jurisdiction) to a traditional, non-
covenant state (Forum State No. 2, = F-2) and there seeks a divorce:
will the new state of domicile recognize the first state's (Forum State
No. 1, = F-i) conditions for dissolution? Put differently: can
covenant marriage legislation effectively assure observance of its
stricter standards nationwide? What if, secondly, the parties, or one
of them, are foreign nationals and one of them seeks a divorce
abroad: will the result depend on whether the petitioner is a national
of F-2 (here: the foreign country where the divorce is sought) or of
the American covenant state, on the nationality of the respondent,
and/or on the present or previous domicile of one or both of the
parties?
II. U.S. INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF COVENANT-MARRIAGE
STANDARDS UPON DIVORCE
A. A Second State's Divorce Jurisdiction
The stricter standards of the covenant-marriage state are at issue
when divorce is sought in a non-covenant state. The second state's
court (F-2) must have jurisdiction-personal and subject matter
jurisdiction-in order to entertain the action. If it does, what law
does it apply? Subsection (B) of this paper addresses the second
question: as will be seen, in American law, jurisdiction and
applicable law merge.
In the first Williams decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the petitioner's domicile was a sufficient basis for the assertion of
apart for one year and both join in the divorce petition. BGB § 1566(1). If only one
spouse seeks the divorce, the presumption arises after a separation of three years.
Despite these waiting periods, German and American divorce rates (before the
introduction of covenant marriages) were quite similar: in 1995, the U.S. divorce
rate (divorces vs. marriages in that year) stood at 50%, the German at 39.4%. By
2001, the German rate had risen to 50.7%, numbers for the U.S. were not available
as ofAugust 2003. For the U.S., see U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the
United States: 2002, chart No. 111, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/02statab/vitstat.pdf. The U.S. rate is an
estimation because some states, including Louisiana, do not report the number of
divorces; for Germany, see Federal Statistical Office, at
http://www.destatis.de/basis/e/bevoe/bevtab 1.htn. (English version has an English
search engine).
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divorce jurisdiction.33 It did not hold that domicile was required or
the only basis; that question was not before it.34 For a divorce with
both parties before the court, whether by appearance or as a result of
the court's personal jurisdiction over the respondent, the
jurisdictional issue becomes resjudicata for purposes of a collateral
proceeding.3" Domicile as a basis for divorce jurisdiction is,
therefore, relevant only when petitioner sought the divorce ex parte
and it was granted upon respondent's default. In these circumstances,
another forum (F-I or yet another state, F-3) may question F-2's
jurisdiction for lack of petitioner's domicile there.
The F-2 court must also have subject matter jurisdiction: it must
have power to grant a divorce, to dissolve a marriage. It is upon this
ground that a Connecticut court declined to entertain a petition for the
dissolution of a Vermont civil union.3 Vermont, in response to a
Vermont Supreme Court decision holding Vermont's marriage laws
unconstitutional when they denied marriage to same-sex couples, had
chosen to establish the legal form of a civil union for such couples.38
By not extending its marriage laws to same-sex couples, the
Connecticut court reasoned, Vermont obviously treated a civil union
as something other than marriage.39 Connecticut, however, only
33. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298, 63 S. Ct. 207,213 (1942).
This conclusion with respect to divorce jurisdiction has old historical roots. In
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877), the Court recognized, in dictum, the
right of "every State ... to determine the civil status and capabilities of all its
inhabitants."
34. For detailed discussion, see Scoles, Hay, Borchers, Symeonides, supra note
3, at § 15.6 et seq.
35. Sherrerv. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 348-49, 68 S. Ct. 1087, 1089-90(1948).
36. See Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092 (1945).
But, "[s]ince an appeal to the Full Faith and Credit Clause raises questions under
the Constitution ... , the proper criteria for ascertaining domicil [jurisdiction of the
first court], should these be in dispute, become matters for federal determination."
Id. at 231 n.7, 65 S. Ct. at 1096 n.7.
37. Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002), appeal
granted, 806 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2002).
38. Vt. Stat. T.15 § 1201 etseq.; Bakerv. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). For
civil unions or registered partnerships elsewhere, see also supra note 11. With the
adoption and amendment of Domestic Partnership legislation by California, Cal.
Farn. Code § 297 et seq., the same issues now arise in relation to such California
partnerships.
39. Similarly, the Court of Justice of the European Community rejected a
Community employee's claim for the family allowance supplement to his pay
because the civil union in which he lived, while formally valid and sanctioned by
Swedish law, was regarded by that law as an alternative to marriage, not identical
with it. Joined Cases C-122/99 P and C-125/99 P; D and Kingdom of Sweden v.
Council of the European Union, 2001 E.C.R. 1-4319.
In contrast, when forum law also recognizes a civil union or other form of same-
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conferred power upon its courts to dissolve marriages, not other
types of unions, unknown to Connecticut law. The court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction.
It is most unlikely that this reasoning would extend to covenant
marriages. They are intended as marriages, between heterosexuals,
by the state of their creation. Apart from the almost universal
choice-of-law rule that a marriage valid where celebrated will be
recognized as valid elsewhere,4 ° an attempt to differentiate between
F-2's type of marriage and the marital status conferred by F-1
would probably be unconstitutional.4'
It, thus, seems quite clear that, for interstate purposes, the
second court would have personal jurisdiction if the petitioner is
domiciled there or both parties are before it, whether domiciled
there in fact or not. It would also unquestionably have subject
matter jurisdiction.
sex partnership, the forum is likely to recognize the foreign partnership. See, e.g.,
German Conflicts Statute [EGBGB] art. 17b(1): the creation of a registered
partnership and its effects, including property rights of the partners, are governed
by the law of the state where the partnership is registered. Limitation: the effects
of a registered partnership contracted abroad do not extend beyond those provided
by the German Civil Code or the Law on Registered Partnerships (2001
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] I 266, amended by 2001 BGBl I 3513); EGBGB art.
17b(4).
40. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283(1) (2003). Exceptions
concern cases where the foreign marriage may violate local public policy, for
instance in cases of incest or polygamy. See Scoles, Hay, Borchers, Symeonides,
supra note 3, at § 13.5 et seq. What happens to this traditional rule with the
appearance of same-sex marriages? In states that have adopted legislation in
response to, and as authorized by the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2003), foreign-country same-sex marriages are unlikely to be
recognized: the local public policy, as expressed in DOMA-legislation, would
overcome the choice-of-law reference. See Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2002): "What constitutes a marriage in ... Georgia is a legislative
function, not a judicial one." In the interstate context, the problem may arise in the
near future. See, e.g., with respect to Massachusetts, supra note 11. As a result,
with more foreign countries facilitating same-sex marriage (supra note 11),
American courts may be expected to have to face the question that the courts in
Rosengarten, 802 A.2d 170, and in Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, could avoid. Opposition
to partnership forms unknown to the forum thus may require some rethinking. For
the recognition of same-sex unions in Europe, see supra note 39; Kurt Siehr, Das
Internationale Privatrecht der Schweiz 67-79 (2002), with extensive bibliography
at 64, and Kurt Siehr, Family Unions, 50 Netherlands Int'l L. Rev. 419 (2003).
For same-sex marriage, see Donald G. Casswell, Moving Toward Same-Sex
Marriage, 80 Can. Bar Rev. 810 (2001).
41. Compare Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 71 S. Ct. 980 (1951) with Wells
v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 73 S. Ct. 856 (1953).
2003]
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B. Applicable Law
1. Current Law: Lex Fori
The emphasis on domicile as a jurisdictional requirement in the
older case law42 at once assumed and justified the application of
local substantive law (the lexfori) to the divorce petition. Because
of the assumption, a close connection to the forum was required for
it to be entitled to exercise jurisdiction: otherwise, the forum would
be interfering impermissibly with the societal interests of the actual
domicile, the home state. It is in part on this ground that the
appellate court in Alton v. Alton 3 agreed that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to grant the divorce that both parties wanted. The close
connection brought the status before the court, as it were: the status,
like a thing-a res-now had a location, and, as a matter of
traditional choice of law, local law (the lexfori as the lex rei sitae)
applies to local "things." In these circumstances, an F-2
(divorcing) court does not ask whether the petitioner could have
obtained a divorce in the state where the marriage was celebrated or
even in which it was lived until the breakup. Its concern is only with
its jurisdiction and the rules of its own substantive law. Applied to
covenant marriages this means that, without more, covenant-state
standards for divorce have no effect on the F-2 decision.
2. Choice of Law Alternatives
a. The Choice-of-Law Clause in the Marriage Contract
(Party Autonomy)
In general, all legal systems seek to apply a closely connected
law, a home law, to status questions. They differ in how they define
that-as the law of the parties' nationality, their domicile, their
marital residence. American courts, as described, opt for domicile
and, by combining the choice-of-law question with the jurisdictional
inquiry, thereby come to the lexfori. Other legal systems separate
these questions. If, under such an approach, the applicable law does
not follow from the exercise of jurisdiction, the obvious question
arises whether the parties may stipulate it themselves. In a
42. See Scoles, Hay, Borchers, Symeonides, supra note 3, at § 15.4 for a
review of the older cases.
43. 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953). For discussion, see infra note 57.
44. Occasional decisions now depart from this rule in property law matters.
See Saunders v. Saunders, 796 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (Colorado
domiciliary law applied to decedent's Florida real property). But, this development
has had no effect on choice of law in divorce as yet.
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Louisiana covenant marriage, the parties stipulate the application of
Louisiana law in their "Declaration of Intent."
Parties are generally free to choose the law applicable to their
contracts. A choice-of-law clause (in itself a contract) need not
even relate to a contractual obligation but, especially in Europe,
may concern claims in tort4" and marital property rights.46
Increasingly, and contrary to earlier practice, the chosen law need
not have a particular relationship to the claim or the parties.47
However, limitations exist everywhere. They are designed to
protect public interests (for instance, currency regulations)
and-particularly important in the present context-the "weaker
party." Modem codifications thus limit party autonomy in
consumer and employment contracts, 8 and courts guard against
unfair terms or conditions on the basis of fundamental values that
may be grounded in notions of due process and public policy.
49
Whether any such considerations militate against acceptance of a
party stipulation away from the otherwise applicable lexfori and
in favor of the lex celebrationis in the present context will be
explored further, below, after review of other choice-of-law
approaches.
45. See EGBGB art. 42; Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Law
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations [Rome II] art. 10, COM (2003) 427
final, art. 10.
46. For the United States, see supra note 31 (Uniform Premarital Agreements
Act) and Scoles, Hay, Borchers, Symeonides, supra note 3, at § 14.4. For
Germany, see EGBGB art. 15 II. See generally K. Siehr, Domestic Relations in
Europe, 30 Am. J. Comp. L. 37, 51 (1982). But see infra note 49.
47. See UCC § 1-301; Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations [Rome Convention], art. 3, 1980 O.J. L 266/1 (in force among
member states of the European Union). Even if a connection were required, the
choice of the law of celebration (Louisiana in the example) would satisfy the
requirement.
48. See, e.g., Rome Convention, supra note 47, arts. 5 (consumer contracts),
6 (individual employment contracts), 7 (mandatory rules of forum or another
country's law).
49. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (cross-collateralization clause in installment purchase agreement);
Stobaugh v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 5 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999)
(burdensome forum selection clause in a cruise contract). See also two decisions
by the German Constitutional Court holding prenuptial agreements about post-
divorce support and matrimonial property to be unconstitutional (by placing
disproportionate burdens on the weaker spouse): Decisions of Feb. 6 and March
29, 2001, [2001] FamRZ 343 and 985, respectively. All of the limitations on the
spouses' freedom to enter into premarital agreements, supra note 3 1, are designed
to protect the weaker party against overreaching or to protect the public interest.
UPAA § 6(a),(b), 9C U.L.A. 48.
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b. Full Faith and Credit to the Lex Celebrationis?
The U.S. Constitution requires states to give "full faith and
credit" to the judgments, records, and "public acts" of other states of
the union. 0 Statutes are public acts. Must F-2 therefore honor F-I's
covenant-marriage statute, quite apart from the spouses' choice of it,
including the statute's limitations on divorce?
Some older decisions did require the forum to apply the statutory
law of another state.5' The last decision to do so, however, may also
be explained on other grounds.5 2 In modem times, the issue arose in
the context of worker compensation statutes: i.e., may a second state
(state of employment, of the injury, or home state of the injured
employee) grant an additional or different recovery than permitted
under the law under which the claimant has already received an
award? The answer has been uniformly "yes," at first, because
recognition might offend F-2's public policy,53 later because F-2
should not be forced always to apply another state's law and never its
own,54 and finally because F-2-virtually---can do what it wants to.55
The last statement overstates the issue. The forum cannot apply
forum law--or any other law-just because it wants to do so.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague56 teaches that the forum must have a
"significant contact" or contacts that are significant in aggregation
before it may apply its law. This limitation derives from the Due
Process Clause: the defendant should not be subject to forum law
with which he or she and the case have no connection. But if the
forum does have the requisite contact so that Due Process is satisfied,
the Full Faith and Credit Clause is no longer a bar to the application
of the lexfori.
In the case of a petition for the dissolution of a convenant
marriage celebrated in F-1, the forum (F-2) does have the requisite
contact: the very facts that entitle it to exercise jurisdiction-
domicile (or other close connection) of the petitioner in the case of an
ex parte divorce or the presence and participation of both parties
(bilateral divorce)-are contacts permitting the choice of the lexfori
50. Scoles, Hay, Borchers, Symeonides, supra note 3, at § 15.8.
51. For a review of the case law, see Scoles, Hay, Borchers, Symeonides, supra
note 3, at §§ 3.24-3.25, 3.30.
52. Id. at § 3.25 n.18, concerning Order of United Commercial Travelers of
Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 67 S. Ct. 1355 (1947).
53. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160, 52 S. Ct. 571, 576
(1932).
54. Pacific Employers Insur. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493,
501, 59 S. Ct. 629, 632 (1939).
55. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413-14, 75 S. Ct. 804, 807-08 (1955).
56. 449 U.S. 302, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985).
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as the applicable law. Application of the lex celebrationis would be
a matter of choice, not of constitutional requirement.
c. The Choice of "Home Law" in Family Matters
In Alton," the appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of
relief for lack of jurisdiction: the parties did not have the requisite
contact with the Virgin Islands forum and application of forum law
would therefore undermine the societal concerns of their home state.
Application of forum law was assumed as a given. Judge Hastie, in
dissent, thought that the concerns of the home state could be
safeguarded by application of its law in circumstances when the
forum's own connection is too slight.5" This thought anticipated by
many years what the decision in Allstate59 today requires in other
contexts. That this is still not the rule in divorce results from two
circumstances: in the uncontested bilateral divorce, jurisdiction and
the substantive result are not open to collateral attack; in an exparte
divorce, the jurisdictional facts furnish the required nexus that
justifies the application of local law. It is in the contested bilateral
divorce where Judge Hastie's thoughts, in combination with the rule
of the Allstate decision, could have currency, especially in the context
of covenant marriages. This assumes, however, that the divorce
petition is brought in a wholly unconnected forum. That is unlikely
to be the case: the petitioner will bring the action in the state of his
or her new home, furnishing domicile as a jurisdictional fact
additional to the participation of the other spouse and, with it, the
freedom for the forum to apply its own law.
This is not to say that, whenever different divorce laws may be
applicable (as now with the emergence of covenant-marriage
legislation), the forum should apply its law and ignore the other.
Judge Hastie's dissent suggests that there are policy reasons to defer
to "home law." That law, incidentally, need not be the lex
celebrationis, but could be another law with a close connection to the
marriage, such as the law of the last matrimonial domicile. This idea
is discussed further in the following section.
European law has long taken a much more differentiated
approach to choice of law for marriage dissolution and has separated
that inquiry from the assertion ofjurisdiction. With "nationality" as
the principle personal connecting factor in older European conflicts
57. 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953).
58. Justice Jackson in Williams !, 317 U.S. 287, 298, 63 S. Ct. 207, 213, also
emphasized the concerns of the home state.
59. Allstate, 449 U.S. 302, 101 S. Ct. 633; Phillips, 472 U.S. 797, 105 S. Ct.
2965.
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law (in contrast to the common law's use of domicile), 0 the law of
the parties' common nationality was thought to have the greatest
concern, express the most relevant societal interests, and that the
forum should safeguard these even though it had jurisdiction.
Alternative references, such as the parties' last common habitual
residence,6' apply when there is no common nationality. The
European approach to divorce is, thus, not basically62 lex fori-
oriented, but rather reflects Judge Hastie's concerns. American case
law, however, continues to adhere to its traditional approach.
d. Generalizing the Choice-of-Law Principles of the
Restatement Second?
American conflicts law-mainly for contracts and torts-has
departed from the rule-orientation of the older law; it seeks to apply
the law that is appropriate for the case, the parties, and even for a
particular issue (dipegage). While several approaches have been
suggested and applied, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
(1971) represents, perhaps, the overarching statement: in the absence
of a valid choice of law by the parties,63 it calls for the application, in
contract and tort, of the law of the "most significant relationship" to
the parties or the issue.' It has been suggested that the Restatement
60. See, e.g., for France, H. Battifol & P. Lagarde, 2 Droit international priv6
79 (7th ed. 1981); for Germany, EGBGB art. 17(1), 1st sentence, in combination
with EGBGB art. 14(1); for Italy, Art. 31 Conflicts Statute.
61. E.g., Germany: EGBGB art. 17(1), 1st sentence, in combination with
EGBGB art. 14(1). European Community law has adopted the spouses' common
habitual residence as the principle jurisdictional basis for divorce. Art. 3(1)(a),
Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003, 2003 Official Journal L 338/1.
62. Exceptions apply if the law of common nationality does not permit divorce,
but the petitioner is also a citizen of the forum: forum law applies. See, e.g., Swiss
Conflicts Statute art. 61(3). German law generalizes this rule to apply to all
otherwise applicable jurisdictional bases. EGBGB art. 17(1), 2nd sentence. In
Swiss law, the lex fori is the default rule when there is no law of common
nationality or even when both spouses reside in Switzerland. Swiss Conflicts
Statute art. 61(1),(2).
63. For the effect o'fthe parties' choice in a covenant marriage, see supra note
45 et seq. and the evaluative comments at infra note 76.
64. The principal provisions are Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws
§ 145 (torts) and § 188 (contracts) (1971). Sections 145(2) and 188(2), which list
a number of contacts to be considered, incorporate by reference the general
principles of § 6. They are discussed below at note 67. Sections 145(2) and 188(2)
also provide that the contacts listed (and others that may be relevant, for the list is
non-exclusive) should be evaluated according to their "relative" importance to the
issue. No further guidance is provided. In addition to the general provision of §
145, the significant relationship test is also invoked for particular tort issues. See
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws §§ 156-173 (1971).
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approach become the standard for choice of law in divorce and that
its application would lead to deference to the law of the covenant-
marriage state as the most significantly related or the state whose
policies would be most undermined by non-application of its law.6"
The Restatement Second test is wider than both Judge Hastie's
suggestion and the rules of European law. Judge Hastie had focused
on "home law." In the context of the case before him, "home law"
was the law of the state from which the parties came (where they
were last domiciled) and which would be evaded by application of
the Virgin Islands' lexfori. The European rules, not formulated with
regard to a concrete case, come closer to the Restatement's goal-
identification of the most significantly related legal system.
However, the Restatement Second is wider still: it contains no
presumptions," and the general principles of its Section 6
accommodate a number of orientations, including a forum bias.6 1 Its
pervasive focus on individual issues (ddpe~age) is unlikely to work
in the covenant-marriage context: for example, should a court defer
to the covenant-marriage state's law for some issues (e.g., grounds),
but not for others (e.g., length of a waiting period)? It is difficult to
see, even if dipe~age were not practiced (because impracticable),
how the Restatement Second approach would lead-as a rule, rather
than only exceptionally (which would not be much help)-to the law
of the covenant-marriage state, rather than to local law or the law of
a third state (not a covenant-marriage state), such as the state of the
65. Spaht & Symeonides, supra note 24, at 1113. This suggestion echoes the
"comparative impairment" approach to choice of law which, with Professor
Symeonides as principal draftsman, became part of Louisiana's conflicts
codification and now has been adopted in Oregon as well. La. Civ. Code art. 3537
(2003); Or. Rev. Stat. § 81.130 (2003).
66. By way of comparison, the Rome Convention, supra note 47, states a
presumption, in art. 4, for the determination of the most closely connected law for
contract cases. The European Community's proposed regulation on choice of law
in tort likewise starts with fixed references, to be displaced, exceptionally, by a
more closely connected law.
67. When the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws calls for the
application of the most significantly related law, it makes that determination subject
to the general principles of§ 6. The principles are not stated in any order of priority
in which the court should consider them. In fact, the court can pick and choose.
Section 6(2)(c) counsels consideration of "the relevant policies of other interested
states," e.g., of the covenant marriage state. Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of
Laws § 6(2)(c). Section 6(2)(b), however, refers to "the relevant policies of the
forum," while (g) considers the "ease in the determination and application of the
law." Id. at § 6(2)(b), (g). When Sec. 6(2)(f) refers to "uniformity of result," it is
unclear in the present context whether interstate or intrastate uniformity of divorce
is the more desirable. Id. at § 6(2)(f). On the Restatement's "general principles,"
see Hay, Flexibility versus Predictability and Uniformity in Choice of Law, in 226
Collected Courses 281, 371-74 (Hague Academy 1991-I).
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last common domicile. Even if, objectively, much may be said in
favor of the covenant-marriage state-as the lex celebrationis and
because of the parties' choice of its law and mutual undertakings of
best efforts-the principles of Section 6, as mentioned, permit a
forum bias. As subsection (f), below, will address in additional
detail, it seems more likely than not that the forum will opt for local
law, given the petitioner's close connection to it.
e. Change of Characterization from Family Law to Contract:
Impairment of Contract?
The previous subsections explored alternatives to the application
of the lexfori from the perspective of choice of law in family law. In
a covenant marriage, however, the traditional notion of "contracting
marriage" has a meaning beyond entering the status of marriage, with
the content and consequences determined by law. It is also, perhaps
predominantly, a contract, of special solemnity, in which-it is
said 6 -the undertaking to use best efforts toward the maintenance of
the marriage is to represent a legal obligation. The express choice of
a validating law (namely, the law of the covenant-marriage state)
underlines the parties' commitment.
If the question at issue-giving effect to the parameters of a
covenant marriage in another state-thus presents questions of
contract law as much as of family law, would the application of the
lexfori by F-2, overriding these parameters, be an unconstitutional
impairment of contract? The answer, quite clearly, must be "no." A
sizeable jurisprudence permits the forum to disregard contractual
limitations, valid where made, when contacts to the forum give it a69
regulatory interest. It is generally thought that the parties may not,
by contract, modify the nature of the marital status, and the Louisiana
rule to the contrary is considered an exception even there. 70 The
contacts to the forum that give it jurisdiction also give it a regulatory
interest in the marriage that is now before it. Limitations contracted
by the parties and valid elsewhere do not diminish the forum's
freedom to apply its own law.
It is free, but it does not have to apply the lexfori. Characterizing
the limitations as contract issues, immediately and quite directly
again implicates the Restatement's choice-of-law rules. Perhaps
these contract issues are more significantly related to the state where
the obligations were under.aken and were to be performed, than to
68. See Spaht & Symeonides, supra note 24, at 1093.
69. See Scoles, Hay, Borchers, Symeonides, supra note 3, at §§ 3.26-3.29,
with references to case law.
70. Supra note 31.
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the forum. But even so, what is the result? By seeking dissolution
in F-2 without observing the contractual limitations, the petitioner
may be in breach (if the applicable law is indeed that of the covenant
state, F-i): the ordinary contract remedy would be money damages
(under F-i, possibly also under F-2 law), but not enforcement.
Unlike in arbitration, no law requires dismissal or abstention so that
the agreed method of settlement can run its course. Absent such a
requirement, a court may, of course, dismiss for other reasons; for
instance, because a forum-selection clause chooses a different court,
or for reasons of forum non conveniens, or because it is unable to
give a remedy.7 ' The first of these may require a reading of the
choice-of-law clause as incorporating a choice of forum. This is not
American law.72 The last of the reasons for dismissal has a parallel
in the existence of equitable relief when the relief at law is
inadequate, and money damages for the breach of undertakings in the
covenant may indeed be inadequate: proceeding with the divorce
leaves the respondent with an empty contract claim.73
Of the three reasons for dismissal, only the first-an implied
choice of forum-would effectuate the (original) intent of both
parties. The other two represent a court-closing, as far as the
petitioner is concerned. All three of the procedural aspects will be
the subject of subsection (g) below. For present purposes, suffice it
to conclude that, while a court may wish to give effect to the
contractual undertakings of the parties in some form, its application
of local law would not be a forbidden impairment of contract.
f The Choice-of-Law Alternatives Evaluated
As discussed earlier, the parties are generally free to choose the
applicable law. Limitations on this freedom protect the weaker party,
such as in consumer transactions. These limitations are grounded in
considerations of public policy. In family law, parties generally
cannot, by contract, redefine marriage or the consequences of its
possible breakdown.74 It follows that what they cannot do by express
stipulation, they cannot do by means of a choice-of-law clause: the
second court, if it has the requisite contact with the party or parties,
will make its own choice of law. The case with a choice-of-law
clause thus does not differ, for these purposes, from one without one.
71. See, in the earlier law, Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 24 S.
Ct. 581 (1904).
72. See infra notes 86-87.
73. See also infra notes 106-09.
74. See also supra notes 49, 62. For the extent that parties can contract
concerning the economic consequences of dissolution, see supra note 31.
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Ignoring the parties' choice of law or their express stipulation does
not impair their contract, inasmuch as they could not make a contract
in this regard. Nor does the Full Faith and Credit Clause command
application of the lex celebrationis.
In these circumstances, the second forum has traditionally applied
local law to decide a petition for dissolution. It bears additional
discussion whether a state that has embraced the Restatement Second
is likely, in the context of covenant marriages, to depart from the
traditional rule or to adhere to it (as the Restatement's forum-
orientation in Section 6(2)(b) would also permit)."5
In an exparte divorce, the petitioner will be a local domiciliary.
Equal treatment with other local domiciliaries may require
application of local law. Even if a distinction based on the place of
marriage formation is constitutionally permissible, public policy
considerations favor helping a locally domiciled petitioner. Even
legal systems that do not apply local law as a matter of course, but
apply the law of the parties' common nationality or last habitual
residence, will make an exception in favor of their own nationals:
local law applies if it would permit divorce when the foreign law
would not." The same result may be expected in an American forum
for which "domicile" takes on the same meaning as the relevant
connecting factor as "nationality" does in the civil law.77 The answer
may be different if an ex parte divorce can be granted on
jurisdictional grounds less than domicile or habitual residence: the
petitioner would no longer be suing "at home." Additionally, Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague78 would then require a determination of whether the
quality of forum contacts permits the application of its law.
If the divorce is bilateral, uncontested, and the parties are perhaps
not even domiciled in the forum, the forum does not have the same
reason to be protective of them: it could engage in Restatement
Second analysis and apply "home law." But why should it deny a
divorce to parties who consensually want it (and, by not suing at
75. Section 6(2) provides that "the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include . . . (b) the relevant policies of the forum."
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 6(2) (1971). Other considerations
listed in Section 6(2) point in both directions. Thus, Section 6(2)(c), "relevant
policies of other interested states," Section 6(2)(d), "protection of justified
expectations," both point to covenant-state law, whereas Section 6(2)(e), "basic
policies underlying the particular field of law," and Section (2)(f), "uniformity,"
and Section 6(2) (g), "ease in the determination and application of the law," may
once again point to forum law.
76. Supra note 62.
77. See supra note 60.




home but in the forum, may even be said to have made an implied
choice of law),79 when it would grant an ex parte divorce (above)
with one party not consenting (at least not expressly)? If the parties
do not want "home law" protection, F-2 would be most unlikely, it
seems, to effectuate the (now abstract) societal interests of F-1.
In a contested bilateral divorce, there obviously is no room to
assume an implied choice of forum law. However, and in contrast to
uncontested, consensual divorce, jurisdiction will be part of the
contest. If the petitioner satisfies the jurisdictional requirement, the
case then does not differ from the exparte divorce discussed above:
forum law will be protective of his or her interests. It is only in the
case that a non-resident petitioner brings the action at the
respondent's domicile (in a non-covenant state)"° that the forum's
protective policies may not apply: the petitioner cannot claim them
and the respondent does not want them, but instead invokes the
policies of the covenant state's law. In this case, the forum has the
sufficient nexus to permit it to apply forum law, but arguably might
choose not to do so in order to protect, in Restatement language, the
respondent's "justified expectations."'" Concern for the uniform
administration and exercise of its divorce jurisdiction, however, may
still lead the forum to apply the lexfori.
Finally, the non-resident petitioner may seek a contested bilateral
divorce against an equally non-resident respondent. In this
constellation, both jurisdiction and the applicable law are at issue.
Depending on whether domicile is or is not required, 2 respondent
may or may not succeed with a motion to dismiss. If the case goes
forward, 3 the lack of a genuine nexus to the forum may now indeed
preclude the application of forum law."' This may be the chosen
(covenant-state) law or the law of another closely connected state
(e.g., that of the last common domicile).
The impairment-of-contract suggestion similarly will not lead to
the enforcement of covenant-marriage-state standards. In Louisiana,
the contractual limitation assumed by the parties is seen as an
exception to their general inability to affect matrimonial law by
79. See infra notes 86-87.
80. If the respondent is still domiciled in the covenant state, the lex-fori
approach of current law would result in the application of its law.
81. Supra note 75.
82. See supra note 33-36.
83. The exercise of jurisdiction must be challenged by appeal. Lack of
jurisdiction cannot be raised collaterally thereafter because the matter has become
res judicata. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 60 S. Ct. 44 (1939).
84. Allstate, 449 U.S. 302, 101 S. Ct. 633; Phillips, 472 U.S. 797, 105 S. Ct.
2965.
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contract.85 The public policy arguments outlined above also support F-
2's refusal to recognize such an exception with respect to its own law.
Even if, contrary to the development of F-2 law, recognition were
generally due to the public acts of F-1, public policy would overcome
it. What remains is (at best) a contract that is valid where made,
unenforceable in F-2 with respect to counseling requirements and
waiting periods, and possibly breached with respect to the "best effort"
part. The last might support an action for breach: seeking what relief?
Not injunctive relief for the public policy reasons stated, hence only for
damages: compensatory damages will be hard to prove and anything
else (pain and suffering, punitive damages) would support enforcement
and will therefore not be granted.
g. Changing the Applicable Law Through Changing Courts
Unless the approach to choice of law in divorce were to change
substantially, the American forum court will apply local law. If the
forum state is not a covenant-marriage state, the only way to have
covenant marriage law apply then lies in a change of courts. As
mentioned above in subsection (e), a change of courts could occur if
the parties have chosen a covenant-state court and the forum honors
the choice or if the forum court were to dismiss for lack of an
appropriate remedy or for reasons offorum non conveniens, whereby
the latter two obviously overlap.
The parties may have made an express selection of a forum for
future disputes. Covenant marriage legislation concerning the
"Declaration of Intent" does not require this and it is not very likely
that the parties will augment the standard document. The question
must then be whether, from all the circumstances, it should be
concluded that they have made an implied forum selection.
In England, the choice of English law may encompass a choice of
forum. 6 This is generally not the case in the United States. 7 The
choice of the forum is separate from that of the applicable law and,
85. Spaht & Symeonides, supra note 24, at 1090 n.22.
86. See Order 11, rule 1(1)(d)(iii) of the Supreme Court of Judicature of
England providing for jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant for claims arising
out of a contract which was to be "governed by English law." For an application,
see Egon Oldendruff v. Liberia Corporations, 1996 Lloyd's Rep. 380 (QB Div.,
Commercial Court, 1995).
87. Compare Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,482,105 S. Ct.
2174, 2187 (1985): "Although [a choice-of-law] provision standing alone would
be insufficient to confer jurisdiction, we believe that, when combined with the 20-
year interdependent relationship Rudzewicz established with Burger King's Miami
headquarters, it reinforced his deliberate affiliation with the forum State and the
reasonable foreseeability of possible litigation there."
[Vol. 64
PETER HAY
while both may occur as a result of implied intent, such intent must
appear clearly from the circumstances."8 In the present case, there may
be argument either way. On the one hand, parties who live in the
covenant state and sign a choice-of-law clause in its favor may have
assumed that any dispute would be resolved there. On the other hand,
it may be stretching this to suppose that parties who have never
addressed the question expressly intend to bind themselves to return to
the covenant state to seek a divorce regardless of where, years after
marrying, they may now find themselves. Additionally, the choice-of-
law clause extends not only to questions relating to dissolution but also
to the obligation to make all efforts to preserve the marriage. The latter
is plainly compatible with jurisdiction elsewhere.
But none of this probably matters. The second forum, it was seen,
exercises divorce jurisdiction and applies its own law because of the
close nexus the petitioner has to it (usually domicile). Concern for the
local petitioner will not be undone by sending him or her to a forum
where he or she no longer wants to be. Hence, even if the parties
initially made an implied choice of the covenant state as the future
forum, that choice will unlikely force the petitioner, who, admittedly,
breaches that undertaking, to sue there.
III. INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF COVENANT-MARRIAGE
STANDARDS
Previous discussion assumed that the spouses, after contracting a
covenant marriage, later find themselves in one or two other states and
one of them there seeks the dissolution of the marriage. The
conclusion reached was that such a state would apply its own law and,
if different, not honor the restrictions of the covenant-marriage state.
What if the issue arises abroad? The following addresses the question
from the limited perspective of some Western European legal systems.
A. Jurisdiction
In the European Union, except Denmark, divorce jurisdiction is
governed by European Community Regulation No. 1347/2000.9
88. Compare Russell J. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 445,
n.22 (4th ed. 2001). In the European Community, a forum selection must be "in
writing or evidenced in writing," or be "in a form that accords with the practices of
the parties," or accords with international usage. Council Regulation No. 44/2001,
2001 Official Journal L 12/1, art. 23. Additionally, jurisdiction lies in the courts of
the stipulated performance of the contract. Id. at art. 5. The legislation on
jurisdiction in matrimonial matters, supra note 61 and infra note 89, does not
provide for a forum selection by the parties at all.
89. See Council Regulation No. 2201/2003, supra note 61.
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According to Art. 3(1)(a), a court has jurisdiction when both spouses
are habitually resident in the state, had their last common habitual
residence in the state and one of them still does, or if the respondent is
habitually resident there. In these circumstances, both parties, or at
least the respondent, have a nexus to the forum. What if the
application is ex parte and the respondent does not have such a nexus?
In these cases, jurisdiction may be based on petitioner's "habitual
residence" which, for these purposes,9 ° is defined as twelve-months
residence before filing or six-months residence when the applicant is
also a national of the state.9" These rules thus require a nexus (habitual
residence of one or both spouses) to the forum: since the court will
examine its jurisdiction ex officio, jurisdiction cannot be conferred
consensually by mere appearance of the spouses. In this respect, the
rules are stricter than in the United States. Indeed, the durational
residence requirement in the case of the ex parte divorce (especially if
sought by a non-national) may be stricter than the American domicile
standard. In one other respect, however, the rules are potentially
troublesome: if no court in the European Union has jurisdiction under
these rules, national law determines jurisdiction. Furthermore, if it
provides for jurisdiction over a non-resident, non-national respondent,
any national of a member state habitually resident in that or another
member state may avail himself or herself ofthat jurisdictional basis.92
B. Applicable Law
1. General Rule: Home Law
Unlike American law, European legal systems do not only look
for a nexus to the parties for the assertion ofjurisdiction but also seek
90. The statutory definition is part of this jurisdictional rule and does not, by
its terms, apply to the term as used in the three situations previously given. It is
unlikely, however, that divergent definitions of national law would apply.
91. In the case of Ireland and the United Kingdom, nationality is replaced by
"domicile," as defined by Irish and English law, respectively. Council Regulation
art. 3(2).
92. Id. at art. 7. The provision calls this "residual jurisdiction." Its second
paragraph-generalizing local bases of jurisdiction-in favor of all Community
residents and against the outside world-parallels Council Regulation No. 44/200 1,
2001 Official Journal L 12/1, art. 4(2), which replaced the Brussels Convention on
Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. Art.
4(2) has been criticized as asserting "exorbitant jurisdiction." Id.; see Kurt H.
Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora, in XXth Century Comparative and
Conflicts Law, Legal Essays in Honor of Hessel E. Yntema 321 (1961); Kurt H.
Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recognition of
Judgments: The Common Market Draft, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 995 (1967). The same
may be said for Council Regulation No. 2201/2003, art. 7(2).
[Vol. 64
PETER HA Y
to apply a law that has a nexus to the marriage.93 In traditional
European conflicts law, it is the law of the parties' common
nationality, at the time the divorce application is made, that applies,94
even if one of them is now habitually resident in the forum state.
Since there is no national "American" law of divorce, the reference
must be particularized further. A U.S. citizen is also a citizen of the
state in which he or she "resides:" 95 the applicable law is the law of
the common state "citizenship." This may be the state where the
covenant marriage was contracted-and its standards therefore are
applicable-or a U.S. state to which the parties had moved
subsequently. In the latter case, the new state's law would apply,
quite possibly not incorporating covenant-state standards. If only one
spouse had moved, covenant-state standards might still apply as the
law of the spouses last common citizenship, as provided by most of
the laws.
Once both parties have acquired a common habitual residence in
the European forum state, European systems differ. Some-for
instance, the Austrian, German, and Italian-still apply home law,
whatever that may be in the case of Americans as just discussed, if
one of the parties is still subject to it.96 In contrast, French and Swiss
law limit the application of home law to the cases stated: hence, if
both parties are now habitually resident in the forum, the lex fori
93. See supra notes 65-67 for the suggestion, for American law, that the court
should adopt the "most significant relationship"methodology for the choice of the
applicable law in divorce. As discussed, this is not current American law.
94. See, e.g., for Austria: § 20, in combination with § 18 Austrian IPRG;
France: Code Civ. art. 310; Germany: EGBGB art. 17 in combination with art. 14;
Italy: Art. 31 (1), Law No. 218 of May 31, 1995, revising Italian Private
International Law; Spain: Art. 107, Law No. 18/1990 of Dec. 17, 1990, amending
the C6digo Civil onmatters concerning nationality; Switzerland: Art. 61, 2ndpara.,
IPRG.
95. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Residence, in this context, may be akin to
"habitual residence" in European understanding. Thus, the use of "domicile" in
European Community legislation on jurisdiction and judgment recognition (supra
notes 88, 92) presented difficulty in relation to England, given that concept's
stricter meaning in English law. Section 41 of the English Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act, therefore, now provides for purposes of Community law that a
person is domiciled in England if he or she resides there and "the nature of [the]
residence indicates . . .a substantial connection with the United Kingdom."
European Community matrimonial legislation (supra notes 62, 89) now employs
the term "habitual residence."
96. What is the state citizenship, supra at 95, of an American who has moved
abroad? It is his or her last state "citizenship." Austrian law provides for a
reference to a more significantly related third-country law when a marriage,
celebrated among foreigners, was intended to have its main effects in Austria. Art.
18(2), 2nd sentence, IPRG.
2003]
LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW
applies.97 Systems other than the French and Swiss will also
ultimately reach forum law, for instance, when there is neither a
present common connection to the law of common nationality or
habitual residence, nor at least maintenance of such by one of the
parties.98
Covenant-state standards, thus, may find application in European
dissolution proceedings, but this would only occur as long as the
nexus to the covenant state continues for both, or at least for one, of
the parties.
2. Exception: Forum Law as the Result of "Hidden Renvoi"
Renvoi describes the practice of considering the applicable
foreign law's conflicts rules and, if these should refer back to the
forum or onward to a third legal system, to follow that reference.
Example: the forum (A), where administration of an estate is
pending, refers to the law of the decedent's nationality at death (B),
the latter to his or her domicile at death (C). Of course, it is also
possible that B or C in the example refer back to A. The question for
A is whether to follow B's reference to C, or, as in the second
example, back to itself. American courts generally do not engage in
renvoi and would apply B substantive law in the example.99 Many
European courts would consider B's conflicts rule and apply C'slaw. l °9
97. France: Code Civ. art. 310; Switzerland: Art. 61, para. 1 in combination
with para. 2, IPRG.
98. See, e.g., for Germany, EGBGB art. 14 German; P. Hay, Internationales
Privatrecht no. 188, 189, 195 (2d ed. 2002). See also, for Switzerland, A. Heini, M.
Keller, K. Siehr, F. Vischer, P. Voelken et al., Kommentar zum Bundesgesetz Uiber
das internationale Privatrecht (IPRG), Anno. 7 to Art. 61 (1993).
99. See generally Scoles, Hay, Borchers, Symeonides, supra note 3, at §§
3.13-3.14. As the next sentence in the text shows, in European practice A, B, and
C reach the same result, while in American practice A's approach does not bring
about such uniformity. Occasional American decisions now engage in renvoi, but
without calling it such: they see in B's conflicts rule an expression of disinterest to
have B law applied which, if that rule refers back to A, then permits the application
of forum law. See, e.g., Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc., 338 Md.
560, 659 A.2d 1295 (1995).
100. The European trend is to limit renvoi. The Rome Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1998 Official Journal C 27/34, in force in
the European Union, excludes it for contract (art. 15) and a pending proposal of a
European Community Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual
obligations would exclude it for tort. National law, however, continues to be the
applicable substantive law in matrimonial and decedents' estates matters, i.e. for
divorce. Some new conflicts codifications, for instance in Eastern Europe, now
generally exclude renvoi, except when the applicable foreign law refers back to the
forum in matters of status. See, e.g., Russian Federation, GK RF (Part VI, Private
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In circumstances when a European court would look to the
American home law of the parties to a divorce proceeding before it,
as discussed in subsection (1), it might consult the American state's
conflicts rules for the law applicable to divorce. It would find none:
the lex fori applies whenever the American court has jurisdiction." 1
To put it differently, the conflicts rule is contained in the
jurisdictional rule: whoever has jurisdiction applies local law; if a
European court has jurisdiction, American courts would assume that
the European court would apply its own law. It is a case, not of an
express, but of a "hidden renvoi" (hidden in the jurisdictional rule). 0 '
"Hidden" renvoi is accepted doctrine in Austria, Germany, and
Switzerland." 3 A reference to American home law (e.g., of a
covenant state) would result in the application of the lex fori. In
countries that do not use "hidden" renvoi, covenant state law or the
law of a successor "home" state would apply.
The inquiry shows that the European court might apply one of
three different laws: the covenant state's, that of a subsequent home
state (another covenant state's, a non-covenant state's, its own), or its
own as a result of "hidden" renvoi. As a practical matter, it may
make little difference at present whether European or covenant-state
substantive law is applied: both require a nexus to the forum for
jurisdiction for ex parte divorce, both provide for fault-based divorce,
and, for no-fault divorce, often provide for waiting periods of similar
length."' 4 Application of European law, however, would disregard
any impediments that might flow from the parties' "Declaration of
Intent." Differences may be more significant when a European
home-law reference is to the law of an American non-covenant state
with lesser requirements for divorce, or when potentially applicable
European law becomes more liberal in the future, as part of the
overall rethinking in Europe of the law relating to marriage, other
forms of partnership, and their respective dissolution.
International Law) art. 1190, Sobranie zakonodatel'stva Rossijskoj Federacii 201,
No. 49, Pos. 4552, German translation in 67 RabelsZ 341, 342 (2003) with
commentary by Oleg Sadikov. Id. at 328; Azerbaijan: Art. 3, Law on Private
International Law of June 6, 2000, German translation 2003 IPRax 386.
101. Supra note 44.
102. See Peter Hay, DieAnwendung US-amerikanischerjurisdiction-Regeln als
Verweisungsnorm bei Scheidung von in Deutschland wohnhaften Amerikanern,
1988 IPRax 265.
103. Austria: Decision of the OGH [Supreme Court] of Nov. 8, 2001, 57
Osterreichische Juristenzeitung 265 (2002); Decision ofthe OGH ofMay 14, 1992,
1993 Zeitschrift fir Rechtsvergleichung 164, with annotation by H. Hoyer at 165;
F. Schwind, Internationales Privatrecht no. 111 (1998). Germany: G. Kegel & K.
Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht 356-59 (8th ed. 2000); Ch. von Bar & P.
Mankowski, Internationales Privatrecht, Vol. I, at 687 n.898 (2003).
104. Supra notes 15, 32.
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IV. OTHER ISSUES
A. The Contract to Use Best Efforts
In the "Declaration of Intent" the parties undertake to use best
efforts to uphold the marriage, an undertaking said to be meant as an
actionable contractual obligation."0 5 Will this undertaking be an
impediment to dissolution, in the sense of calling for dismissal of an
application for failure first to have explored all avenues for
maintaining the marriage?
In the covenant state itself, there may be argument for an
affirmative answer, perhaps not so much as a matter of contract law
but as a definition of the subject matter jurisdiction of that state's
courts.'0 6 In other courts-in non-covenant states or abroad-the
answer must be found in contract law, since the covenant state cannot
circumscribe their jurisdiction.
In American non-covenant courts, dismissal would specifically
enforce the contractual obligation. But specific performance is not
a remedy for this kind of highly personal obligation. The drafters of
the legislation themselves see damages as the remedy for breach, 7
even though they do not explain how such damages would be
quantified. In the United States, perhaps more importantly, it is
difficult to see how a state could deny access to divorce jurisdiction
to one group of residents and not to others on the basis of the fact that
the marriage was contracted out of state and therefore subject to
impediments to its dissolution.
Foreign legal systems that apply home law will make exceptions
when home law precludes dissolution. Mere difficulty, however, is
not enough: "there is no basic civil right to divorce."1°8 Moreover,
European contract law, contrary to the common law, does not regard
the remedy of specific performance as extraordinary. Nonetheless,
the action would not be dismissed: to do so would unacceptably
allow foreign law to define local subject matter jurisdiction or treat
105. Supranote3l.
106. For a parallel, see the first New York get statute which withheld the
granting of a civil divorce until impediments to remarriage (including "religious
restraints," such as the issuance of a get) had been removed. New York, Domestic
Relations Law § 253 (McKinney 1986). For discussion, see Michael Broyde,
Marriage, Divorce and the Abandoned Wife in Jewish Law (2001), particularly at
35 etseq. See also Michael Broyde, Later Jewish Tradition, in Covenant Marriage
in Comparative Perspective (John Witte, Jr. & Michael Broyde eds., forthcoming
2004).
107. Spaht, supra note 29, at 103.
108. See Staudinger/v.Bar/Mankowski, Konmentar zum EGBGB, Art. 17, no.
106 (13th ed. 1996), with references to German case law.
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the contract as an implied choice-of-court clause, a reading rejected
earlier.'O' Again the remedy will be damages. Their award raises its
own conflict-of-laws questions and problems; they will not be
pursued further here.
B. Consequences of Dissolution
The dissolution of a marriage raises questions regarding its
consequences for other aspects of the relations of the parties,
particularly: marital property, child custody, and support. To the
extent that these require judicial resolution, this will ordinarily occur
at the time of dissolution in a bilateral divorce. Subsequent changes
(in child custody and support) as well as the initial determination in
an ex parte divorce raise separate questions of jurisdiction and
applicable law. ' Covenant-marriage legislation does not purport to
cover, and the parties' "Declaration of Intent" does not address, the
incidents of marriage and the consequences of dissolution. Existing
law remains unaffected.
V. CONCLUSION
In the United States, the lex celebrationis ordinarily"' governs
the validity of the marriage, the lex fori governs divorce. As to
divorce, judicial jurisdiction and applicable law converge. In a
covenant state, an out-of-state covenant-state marriage will be judged
by covenant-state standards, but not because the forum adopts the
out-of-state standards, but because these standards are now also local
law. Covenant-marriage standards then become applicable much in
the same way that a "uniform" law applies as local law-not as a
function of the law of conflict of laws.
If a covenant marriage is sought to be dissolved in a non-
covenant state, the stringency or permissiveness of the latter's
substantive law will determine the prerequisites for divorce. The
same is generally true abroad. While, in contrast to the United States,
many foreign legal systems do apply home law as a matter of
conflicts law (and would thus respect covenant-state restrictions
109. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
110. For discussion in the American (mainly) interstate setting, see Scoles, Hay,
Borchers, Symeonides, supra note 3, at § 15.27 et seq.
111. The statutory exception (Marriage Evasion Laws) is inapplicable here. It
provides for non-recognition, by the forum, of a marriage contracted elsewhere by
forum domiciliaries in evasion of forum restrictions (e.g., minimum age). The
legislation is in force in only a few states. See Scoles, Hay, Borchers, Symeonides,
supra note 3, at § 15.16.
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when American sister states would not!), this reference to home law
is quite limited. "Hidden renvoi," where it is accepted doctrine, leads
to forum law. In other countries, forum law takes over as the ties to
home law become looser, or as a nexus to the forum (such as habitual
residence of the parties) in fact now makes the latter the home.
Covenant-marriage legislation seeks to counteract permissiveness
and to redefine the bonds of marriage in more traditional terms.
Opposite trends in Europe and elsewhere seek to redefine the legal
nature of relationships and to revisit the preconditions for the
dissolution of traditional marriages. The Netherlands has a single
form of marriage for heterosexual and same-sex unions by
legislation. Ontario made same-sex marriage possible by judicial
decision." 2 A great many European countries provide for registered
partnerships (as do Vermont and, more recently, California with their
institution of "civil unions") for same-sex couples that, except for the
name, provide the same rights and duties as the traditional marriage.
The divide between these trends- nationally and internationally
-and covenant-marriage legislation is growing. Despite a traditional
home-law orientation in the conflicts law of many civil law countries,
a nexus to the forum will lead to forum law. The contract aspect of
the "Declaration of Intent" does not change this conclusion: party
choice does not change forum policy. If this means no enforcement
through dismissal, a damage remedy for breach will also not be
awarded at a level to function as the indirect equivalent to
enforcement. Little then remains.
The legal efficacy of covenant marriages is basically restricted to
the state in which they are contracted when the issue arises there.
Parallel effects in other states will be the result of parallel legislation,
in analogy, as stated, to uniform laws.
112. Supra note 11. The Ontario decision resulted in a surge of application for
marriage licenses by same-sex couples. "From early June [of 2003] through late
February [2004], 1,143 of the 12,046 couples who got married in Toronto were of
the same sex. One-fourth of those same-sex couples were from the United States."
Dan Chapman, Gay Union Pioneers Send Ripples South, The Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, Mar. 4, 2004 (Home ed.), at IA.
[Vol. 64
